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Abstract 
Within the field of death and bereavement studies, the assumption that loss 
and bereavement provide the spur to creativity has become so widespread as 
to assume the status of a conventional wisdom. With this in mind, this paper 
surveys the literature on the topic, extant and contemporary, revealing its 
diffuseness as well as the multi-disciplinary synergies produced by those 
working in disparate academic and clinical fields of practice. In so doing, the 
paper explores what it means to be creative in the context of loss and 
bereavement; the potential for self-development and personal growth offered 
by creativity and loss; the theoretical premises linking creativity and loss; and 
the application and challenges for creative therapies in the institutional 
context of hospice and palliative care.   
 
 
‘There’s a lot of power in creativity. There’s a lot of power in writing things down. 
Poetry—and poetry especially is like singing on paper […]—I think it feeds the soul’ 
(Joy Harjo, cited in Miller, 2013, p.107) 
‘Creative work is integral to the process, often unconsciously, of mourning lost love. 
Without mourning there can be no self-development, understanding or change. 
Without mourning we are psychically ill-equipped for creative living. Without 
mourning we are hampered in preparing for our own loss, as it were, in death’ 
(Anthony Elliott, 1999, p. 5) 
‘Art seems to bring us closer to what language cannot reach and to what poets prove 
evaporates in exploration and translation’ 
(Sandra Bertman, 2000, p. 53)  
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Introduction 
It is not unreasonable to surmise, somewhat intuitively, that the attendant feelings 
engendered by loss of any kind, but especially those summoned by bereavement, should 
debilitate and disorientate rather than provide the spark for creative endeavour. The 
wretched feelings of loss, when one’s assumptive world1 (Beder, 2004/5; Kauffman, 2002; 
Neimeyer, 2005; Parkes, 1975, 1988) has been torn asunder by the physical disappearance 
of people, places, social relationships and predictability of everyday routines that are 
themselves profound sources of meaning, (Marris, 1974; Thompson, 2012), should in 
some sense, and by right, be productive less of creativity than the impulse toward anger 
and destructivity. That chaos, disorganisation, despair and feelings of anger are the initial 
residents in the dwelling we call grief has been well-documented by theorists of grief and 
loss (Bowlby, 1980; Kϋbler-Ross, 1969; Parkes & Prigerson, 2010). Ariès’ (1974, p. 92) 
comment, that ‘a single person is missing…and the whole world is empty’, captures 
succinctly and attests to the acute, and so often ineffable, feelings of being bereft wrought 
by bereavement in the modern era. In the aftermath of bereavement and loss, meaning and 
identity are themselves called into question (Butler, 2003, 2004; Cox, Bendiksen & 
Stevenson, 2003; Fulton & Bendiksen, 1994) in ways that, initially at least, appear to 
negate and militate against the potential for creativity. 
 
In the mass trauma and catastrophic aftermath of the Holocaust, an absolute event of 
history (Blanchot, 1995) that defied comprehension as well as meaning, Theodor Adorno’s 
claim, that ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’ (Adorno, 1983, p.  34), appeared 
not only to suggest that the Holocaust defied representation, the experience of which was 
unspeakable, but that creative efforts at representation were glib and indulgent (Bertman, 
2003, p.  204; Richardson, 2005). In a philosophical and existential sense, death in general, 
as Zygmunt Bauman (1992, p. 2) has suggested, is the absolute (and unimaginable) Other 
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of being, and as such, ‘“absolute nothing” makes no sense’ (see also Sartre, 1957; c.f. 
Heidegger, 2001). Attempts to render death (as the negation of being), suffering, and loss 
more generally, as meaningful can be found in a variety of sources, each of which can be 
understood as creative activity: in religious and spiritual endeavour (theodicy, for Berger 
(1969, p.  69) is ‘the religious legitimation of anomic phenomena’, chief of which is death); 
in clinical and therapeutic interventions where the aim is to create a meaningful legacy and 
find benefit in bereavement and loss (Bonanno, 2011; Holland, Currier & Neimeyer, 2006; 
Neimeyer & Sands, 2011); and in the use of the creative arts as a means of engaging the 
bereaved and/or terminally ill in a range of pursuits designed to channel feelings of anger 
and destructiveness generated by bereavement and loss (Harlow, 2005) by creating an 
alternative, more hopeful and positive reality out of circumstances dominated by confusion 
and pain (Bolton, 2008b; Morgan, 1997; Watts, 2009).  
 
Against the nagging misgiving that loss and grief breed only sadness, anomic despair, and 
nihilistic rage (as well as sometimes violence) comes a plethora of evidence which 
suggests the opposite: that the loss of others, of intimate relationships, of anything, in short, 
that we have invested with meaning (and which functions in turn as a profound sense of 
meaning and identity), can serve to unleash the creative potential within each of us 
(Bertman, 1999, 2003; Pereira-Stubbs & Rawlence, 2008). While the germ of this 
creativity may reside within each and every one of us, helping to heal the wounds of lost 
love as well to facilitate an ongoing relationship with the deceased (Klass et al, 1996; 
Valentine, 2008; Walter, 1996), it so often requires the nourishment, encouragement and 
support of therapists employed in the creative arts (Bolton, 2008b; Watts, 2009). There are 
occasions of course, the Holocaust being the most obvious case in point, that appear to 
give lie not only to its ‘unspeakability’ but also to the apparent need for guided therapeutic 
support to help unleash this creative potential. The voluminous corpus of creative first-
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hand material, especially poetry and autobiographical victim/survivor testimonies 
(Borowski, 1976; Frank, 2011/1947; Levi, 2014/1963), were, after all, unbidden attempts 
to communicate the incommunicable, to make sense of an event at once senseless and 
incomprehensible.  
 
Even in the darkest of times, therefore, the human impulse and capacity for creativity 
cannot be fully extinguished; indeed, suffering and loss may inspire and nourish creativity 
as much as they threaten to destroy it (Elliott, 1999; Homans, 1989; Kristeva, 1989). The 
journey from Holocaust to hospice, where the creative-as-healing arts are at its very core, 
is illustrated in the comments of one of its founding mothers, Elisabeth Kϋbler-Ross. As a 
relief worker following the end of the Second World War, Kϋbler-Ross visited the 
Maidanek concentration camp and was struck by the hundreds of butterflies—a powerful 
symbol of re-birth amidst mass death—carved upon the camp wall by the children there, 
remarking in an interview that: ‘It was incomprehensible to me. Thousands of children 
going to the gas chamber, and this is the message they leave behind—a butterfly. That was 
the beginning’ (Redwood, 2005). This was of course the beginning for Kϋbler-Ross of a 
lifetime of devotion to the terminally ill and their families. It was also part of the 
beginning of the use of the creative arts in hospice and palliative care (another part 
originating in British psychiatric hospitals of the 1940s (Watson et al, 2005, p.  696)), and 
it is the beginning of our journey as I attempt to chart a course through the literature on 
creativity and its relationship to bereavement and loss.  
 
Before doing so, it will be useful to clarify, exactly, what we mean by creativity. I use 
creativity in a broad, though deliberately limited sense, to refer to the human proclivity for 
invention, innovation and the capacity and desire to create. Such creativity can come in the 
physical and material form: the fashioning of an object, a product, a piece of writing or art, 
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from nothing. I qualify this ‘nothing’ in the sense that creativity does not emerge ex nihilo, 
but, in a broadly sociological sense, is inspired by external influences, especially people, 
places and lived experience more generally. The ‘out of nothing’ refers to the fact that 
while creative ideas, and/or their material manifestation, may have existed in embryo, they 
did not already exist but required human intervention and agency on the part of an 
individual(s) in order to summon their existence. Creativity can also come in the form of 
new, novel or reconstituted meaning and ideas that serve to transform existing reality. 
Meaning-making of this sort is especially important following bereavement and loss, 
where the capacity for recovery and resilience stems in part from an ability to re-learn the 
world (Attig, 2001, 2002, 2011) in a process of meaning reconstruction (Holland et al, 
2006; Neimeyer, 2001) that is supported theoretically and empirically by constructivist 
psychology. Yet creativity, as Morgan (1997, p.  351) reminds us, is more than simple re-
production: ‘Creativity is a power of engendering, of producing, not simply reproducing 
what was already there, but in bringing into existence what has yet to be.’ 
 
While the terms grief, bereavement and mourning are themselves used interchangeably, 
they each convey different aspects of our encounter with loss (DeSpelder & Strickland, 
2011, p. 334). Significantly for our purposes, if bereavement refers to the objective state of 
having been deprived or dispossessed of someone (usually through physical death) or 
something, then the terms grief and mourning refer to activities, rather than a state of being, 
by which one responds to that loss (Corr & Corr., 2013). Grief, as task-based bereavement 
theorists have demonstrated (e.g. Worden, 2009), is not simply a set of emotions that 
accompany our reaction to loss; it is also an endeavour (a ‘work’ or ‘travail’ in Freudian 
terms) by which we address the activating sorrow in the psycho-social transition (Parkes, 
1988) to a changed reality without the person or ‘thing’ we have lost. If grief is the ‘inner’ 
reaction to loss of various kinds, mourning is its ‘outer’ physical demonstration—in public 
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displays and rituals intended to facilitate and guide us on our journey through grief. 
Individual states of bereavement, moreover, and the attendant activities of grief and 
mourning, are themselves socially inflected (Katz, 2001, p. 6), permeated by social and 
cultural influences that too have a significant bearing on the types of creativity produced.  
 
Creativity in grief and mourning can be found in a wide variety of material practices 
reflective of the growth in expressivism and a renaissance in public rituals surrounding 
death and dying (Walter, 1994). Marked both by their visibility as well as their 
accessibility (Woodthorpe, 2010), the rituals and practices surrounding both public and 
private dying and mourning in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century reflect the 
tendency for reviving half-forgotten traditions, while at the same creatively adding to these 
traditions by giving them a personal twist in ways that reflect and are indexical to the 
identity of the deceased and/or bereaved. RIP/memorial tattoos, roadside shrines, 
Facebook grieving, the revival of momento mori jewellery, celebratory funeral practices, 
‘pathographies’ and v/blogs by which the dying narrate their experiences—all of these 
represent an apparent sea change in attitudes toward death and dying. All, to varying 
degrees, represent small acts of creativity by which individuals have sought a more active 
and ‘producerly’ (Fiske, 2010) role in their own and others death and dying (though some 
will inevitably bear the influence of what has been copied from others in ways that are less 
creative than they are derivative). Nevertheless, the synergy created between public and 
private mourning speaks more of the desire for creativity reflective of a postmodern 
cultural aesthetic than it does the formulaic and proscriptive cultural forms in death ritual 
and mourning customs characteristic of the Victorian and Fordist eras; when death was 
hidden and sequestered, a subject best left unstirred, and untouched, because it was ‘an 
obscenity to be avoided’ (Feifel, 2013/1990, p. 9).2 
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Theoretical Premises 
A long-standing, though not always fully articulated assumption, is that love and loss are 
twin pillars that have provided the impetus for great works of art and creative genius, from 
the fine art of painting and sculpture, to the literary art of novels and poetry, and myriad 
others in between. The productive nature of loss is a theme identified by Kearl (1989) 
when he describes the observations of Orson Welles in the 1949 film The Third Man: ‘that 
thirty years of warfare, terror and bloodshed in medieval Italy produced the Renaissance, 
whereas five hundred years of peace in Switzerland produced the cuckoo clock’ (Kearl, 
1989, p. 380). Until the publication of Freud’s (1917/1957) ground-breaking essay 
‘Mourning and Melancholia’ in 1917, which attempted to explain in scientific detail the 
process and working-out of grief, attempts to express the contours and experiences of grief 
and loss had been largely the preserve of poets and artists, from Shakespeare and John 
Donne, through John Keats and Emily Dickenson, to Robert Frost, Virginia Woolf and 
innumerable others besides. Where artists and poets had first attempted to describe the 
emotions elicited by loss, and where Freud had first sought to explain these emotions by 
placing their analysis within a scientific framework, it fell to philosophers to explore the 
symbiotic relationship between loss and creativity; between loss and the unbidden impulse 
to create, to fashion something novel and new from the remains of what has been left 
behind (Eng & Kazanjian, 2003).  
 
Existentialist philosophy in particular, especially the work of Martin Heidegger, has 
discerned a special relationship, an ‘elective affinity’ to borrow a phrase from German 
sociologist Max Weber, between suffering—especially a suffering borne of loss—and 
creativity. As Heidegger explains:  
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‘All creative action resides in a mood of melancholy, whether we are clearly 
aware of the fact or not, whether we speak at length about it or not. All creative 
action resides in a mood of melancholy, but this is not to say that everyone in a 
melancholy mood is creative.’  
(Heidegger, 2001, pp. 182–183) 
In contrast to Sartre, for whom death negates meaning as the embodiment of nothingness, 
Heidegger sees in death the potential by which human experience is irrevocably altered 
by our knowledge of it. The very anticipation of our own death, as absolute certainty, 
elicits fear and creativity to the extent that the meaning of life is itself transformed in such 
a way that we live our lives in relation to death, or in Heideggerian terms, as ‘being-
toward-death.’ The intimacy between death and philosophy more generally is deep rooted 
and extends beyond the brooding existentialism of Nietzsche and Heidegger. It can be 
found in the German idealism of G.W.F Hegel (1977), where it serves, dialectically, as 
the basis for individuation. It can be found too in Montaigne’s (1993) maxim that ‘to 
philosophise is to learn how to die’, for both involve the metaphysical separation of body 
and soul (Plato, 1991). 
 
These themes have been taken up in the work of theorists, each of them philosophers in 
their own way, whose thinking has elaborated the relationship between death and 
unconscious processes of mind: in Freud’s psychoanalytic theorising of death denial and 
the ways in which the unconscious imagination ‘behaves as if it were immortal’ (Freud, 
1915/1957, p.  296); in the cultural anthropology of Ernest Becker (1973) and the very 
notion that the production of culture itself is an audacious (and unconscious) attempt to 
stave-off mortality and all thinking about it; and in the semiotic psychoanalysis of Julia 
Kristeva (1989), where melancholic suffering is the basis of sublimated artistic activity. 
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Here, as Kristeva puts it: ‘loss, bereavement, and absence trigger the work of the 
imagination as much as they threaten it and spoil it’ (Kristeva, 1989, p. 9). More than this, 
however, while melancholy may serve to summon aesthetic activity, the creative process 
itself, Kristeva appears to suggest, may help to overcome the melancholy that helped 
produce it. The paradox, for Becker, is that while the source of creativity is the thought of 
death, leading to ways in which we seek to transcend mortality by producing cultural 
artefacts which serve as enduring legacies intended to ensure symbolic immortality, the 
net result of cultural activity is that of death denial, and worse still, the reproduction of 
death and destruction in the heroic projects explicitly designed to eliminate evil.3            
 
Psychoanalytic Approaches  
Attempts to explore and to understand the relationship between identity, mourning and 
loss, as well as the relationship between human consciousness of mortality and 
unconscious processes of mind, lay at the very heart of the project of psychoanalysis. 
Specific attempts to examine the symbiosis between creativity and loss have indeed been 
dominated by psychoanalytic approaches, from Freud, through Melanie Klein, to Julia 
Kristeva.4 Within this framework of analysis, creativity is conceived and envisioned within 
the realm of the imaginary, as a product of unconscious and sublimated mental processes 
by which an idea, vision or fantasy is stimulated or summoned, often by a precipitating 
event in the external world, where it is filtered and worked-upon through interior and 
unconscious experiences of selfhood. In psychoanalytic terms, loss is itself constitutive of 
selfhood, setting in train a process of individuation by which the individual comes to 
recognise her (sic) difference and sameness from (m)other (Elliott, 2002; Hershkowitz, 
2013).5 The first and most significant of losses in the external world, which serve as a 
trigger for the unconscious imagination, is the separation of infant from mother. At once 
experienced as both exhilarating (because of the promise of freedom and independence) 
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and frightening (because of the fear of abandonment), the infant compensates for such loss 
by re-creating her (sic) in the realm of fantasy, whereby the infant has ‘created an object 
out of the mother’ (Freud, 1926/1957, p. 170).6 
 
Taken up in the object-relations school of psychoanalysis developed by Melanie Klein 
(1975), creative (and profoundly imaginative) manifestations of selfhood emerge from 
attempts to negotiate the ‘depressive’ position first experienced during childhood. It is here, 
for Klein, in the profound ambivalence experienced during infancy toward the mother (as 
an object that is both loved and hated), that creative and re-creative attempts at reparation 
are made for the damage done through the violence of destructive and persecutory 
fantasies about the mother (as object) and maternal breast (as ‘part-object’). Idealised and 
disparaging fantasies characteristic of the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position, in which mother is 
‘split’, as ‘dirty goddess’ (Dinnerstein, 1978, p. 124), between binary and highly unstable 
poles, are—in the long term at least—unsustainable, leading to experiences that are 
incongruous with external reality and which hinder self-development. Destructive fantasies 
projected outward toward (m)other—of hatred, violence and envy (themselves 
manifestations of the death drive), are, in Kleinian terms, self-defeating, for the projection 
of such feelings onto (m)other in order to relieve feelings of anxiety stimulates fears that 
the object of the infant’s vengeance will in turn retaliate and attack it. Genuine creativity, 
for Klein therefore, is rooted in attempts to restore and recreate the lost object—denigrated 
in fantasy—as a good object; it is a restorative effort to assuage feelings of guilt and 
despair for having fanaticised the (m)others destruction.7  
 
Creativity, especially as envisioned in psychoanalysis (as well as within wider schools of 
psychology and psychiatry) bears an intimate relationship to grieving. The process of 
grieving, as Parkes and Prigerson (2010) explain, is a creative activity by which the 
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bereaved attempt to re-construct a viable image of the deceased; an image that transcends 
the typically idealised memories that tend to prevail immediately following bereavement 
but which do not provide a consistent picture of the person ‘as a whole.’ Successful 
grieving, in this respect, involves attempting to reconstruct the fragmentary picture we 
have of the person we have loved and lost; fragmented because their lives ‘have been so 
close to our own that we have experienced them in a thousand…parts’ (Parkes & Prigerson, 
2010, p. 71). Grieving is also creative to the extent that it behoves the bereaved to 
rediscover an identity both separate from the life of the beloved with whom their identity 
is so often intertwined as to be indistinguishable, as well as to restore the beloved to a 
place within the bereaved person’s ongoing life that is both positive and viable (Worden, 
2009).   
 
As we have seen already above, loss, in psychoanalytic terms, is a vehicle by which 
individuation is summoned; by which a sense of self is created. Following bereavement, 
such creativity is witnessed in the transformative, though painful, opportunity for self-
development and personal growth that are essential elements in the work of mourning, and 
the means by which a sense of sense is re-created or create anew. In the most relational, 
socially inflected interpretations and applications of psychoanalysis, not only does 
mourning provide an opportunity to attempt to fathom what it is, exactly, that has been lost 
in the person that we have lost (Butler, 2004, p. 21)—for this is not always abundantly 
clear to us—but also an opportunity to unravel the intersubjective ties (Benjamin, 1990), 
by which our relationships have been constituted, as a means of understanding ourselves. 
This is in part what Elliott (1999, p. 46) means when he writes that ‘people create 
themselves through forgetting and remembering their losses.’ It is more fully encapsulated 
by post-structuralist feminist philosopher Judith Butler when she writes:  
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‘Perhaps…one mourns when one accepts that by the loss one undergoes one will be 
changed, possibly forever. Perhaps mourning has to do with agreeing to undergo a 
transformation (perhaps one should say submitting to a transformation) the full result 
of which one cannot know in advance…. When we lose certain people, or when we 
are dispossessed from a place, or a community, we may feel that we are undergoing 
something temporary, that mourning will be over and some restoration of prior order 
will be achieved. But maybe when we undergo what we do, something about who 
we are is revealed, something that delineates the ties we have to others, that shows us 
that these ties constitute what we are, ties or bonds that compose us…Perhaps what I 
have lost “in” you, that for which I have no ready vocabulary, is a relationality that is 
composed neither exclusively of myself nor you, but is to be conceived as the tie by 
which those terms are differentiated and related.’  
(Butler, 2004, pp. 21–22)   
 
Hospice, Efficacy and the Therapeutic Value of Creativity 
With the growth of hospice and the establishment of palliative care in the second half of 
the twentieth century, there has been a growing recognition and acceptance of the role of 
art and creativity, embodied in the concept of holism, as complementary to the scientific 
thought dominating medical practice (Watson et al, 2005). In the context of hospice, which, 
as Corr and Corr (2013, pp. 202) remind us, is as much philosophy as it is facility, the uses 
and benefits of the creative arts have been well documented. Aside from helping to 
provide a distraction from the pain, anxiety and daily regimen of medical care intended to 
alleviate suffering that can come to dominate the experience of palliative/hospice care 
(Graham-Pole, 2000), engagement in creative activity has been used to help re-construct a 
sense of meaning and purpose shattered by terminal illness (Bertman, 2003; Neimeyer, 
2012), to increase the dying person’s feelings of self-worth and motivation for life 
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(Calman, 2000; D’Lima, 2004; Watts, 2009), and to help re-assert a degree of mastery and 
control in circumstances in which the dying person may feel as if they have little or no 
control over a condition and the medical response to it (Bailey, 1990; Jarret, 2007; Morgan, 
1997). 
  
In circumstances in which the person is dying, treating the anxiety and suffering 
precipitated by the knowledge that one is dying (the ontological angst, if you will, induced 
by the thought of non-being), is as important as treating the physical pain resulting from 
terminal illness (Bertman, 2003; Bolton, 2008b). Developing a new skill or re-engaging an 
old one, can, as Morgan (1997, p.  352) suggests, have a positive effect by providing 
‘tangible proof that one is still alive and learning.’ Discovering a hidden talent or new-
found pleasure in creativity may similarly provide a sense of achievement and personal 
fulfilment (Watson et al, 2005) for those who are terminally ill. More fundamentally, the 
impulse to create lies at the heart of what it means to be human, for it is in the act of 
creating that we ‘give birth to ourselves’ (Graham-Pole, 2008, p. 67), unleashing a sense of 
agency and self-identity that are vital aspects of a deeper sense of well-being; a well-being 
that remains possible even in the face of one’s own mortality (Pereira-Stubbs & Rawlence, 
2008, p. 30). 
 
For those who are dying, creativity can serve as a powerful counterweight to the sense of 
powerlessness, invisibility and social death (Elias, 1985; Sudnow, 1967) that routinely 
accompanies the process of terminal illness (Jarrett, 2007).8 Jarrett (2007) has written 
about the ways in which creativity can, if harnessed effectively, serve to transform power 
relationships within the context of hospice and palliative care: of how, for example, 
creativity is important in helping the individual not only find a voice with which to 
articulate their anxieties and fears, but also, crucially, in summoning a listener. The use of 
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narrative based medicine can in this way enable the patient to become an active participant 
in their illness and care rather simply a passive victim or recipient of it, allowing both 
doctor and patient to educate each other about how to communicate (Jarrett, 2007, p. xiii). 
Simple steps like encouraging the terminally ill to create art for the hospice walls in which 
they are being cared for can similarly serve a deeply political and transformative function, 
enabling them to take ownership of the space in which they receive their care in ways that 
encourage a greater personal responsibility for what goes on in that place (ibid., pp. x-xi). 
Work such as this illustrates the intersection and multi-disciplinary synergy created 
between the creative arts, humanities, social sciences and palliative care community 
(Bertman, 1991).  
 
There is some debate as to the guided use of creative therapy with terminally ill patients. 
For purists, art should seek no purpose other art itself—as ‘art only for art’s sake.’ For 
others, while there is a creative germ in each of us, such creativity requires the careful 
cultivation of professional therapists trained in the use of the creative arts (Bailey, 1990; 
Bolton, 2008b; Romanoff & Thompson, 2006). While guided therapeutic intervention may 
yield benefits for patients, their care givers/families, and healthcare professionals alike 
(Coulehan & Clary, 2005; Mason et al, 2008; Watts, 2009), there is also the risk that that 
the power of therapists—embodied in knowledge, expertise and control—may 
inadvertently be exercised over vulnerable clients; that in allowing therapists to enter the 
deeply personal and subjective world of the terminally ill it may somehow be colonised by 
them (Watts, 2009). Such tendencies can be countered through the increasing use of 
reflective—and indeed, reflexive—practice (Brookfield, 1995; Kolb, 1984; Moon, 2004; 
Schon, 1991; Thompson & Thompson, 2008), though more research is needed from artists 
and creative therapists themselves to evaluate self-critically the efficacy and ethical 
limitations of the work that they do (Hartley, 2008). 
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A key difficulty facing the use of the creative arts in the context of hospice and palliative 
care is how to evaluate their effectiveness and efficacy (McGuiness & Finucane, 2011). In 
a climate of fiscal austerity (escalated in the financial crisis post-2008), the use of a 
conventional business model in which services are appraised according to an 
organisation’s bottom line, does not lend itself (Watts, 2009), and cannot fully capture, the 
value-added by creative therapies. Precisely because the value of creative therapies cannot 
be evaluated using a crude economic metric, and partly because any attempt to measure 
the value of creative therapies appears somewhat incongruent with evidence-based 
medicine, any such resistance to an audit culture that has become so widespread in other 
sectors of society has left us with ‘a barren evidence landscape’ (Watts, 2009: 103). In 
resource depleted systems of healthcare, there is a risk that such services are perceived as 
the ‘low hanging fruit’; ‘a valuable but unjustifiable luxury’ (ibid., p. 104).     
 
Conclusion 
The corpus of literature on creativity, bereavement and loss is diffuse—dominated by 
some disciplinary fields and areas of special academic interest (psychoanalysis, 
thanatology, the creative arts), but not colonised or confined to anyone of them; spread 
across a wide array of fora and found in a variety of forms, from tightly focused special 
issue journals, such as this one, to chapters within more broadly focused books on death 
and dying, to works in which creativity and loss constitute only a passing, but important, 
part of a broader theme (for example, on meaning-making and meaning reconstruction 
following bereavement). The synergies created, between individuals and across 
organisational and disciplinary domains, reflect the expansive and capacious nature of 
creativity (including what it means to create or to be creative) and its application to, and 
precipitation by, bereavement and loss. Bertman’s (1991, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2008) 
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voluminous and long-standing contribution to the field is perhaps an exemplar of the 
interdisciplinary uses of creativity, especially the invocation not only of the creative arts, 
humanities, and social sciences, but also of healthcare providers and users in a matrix that 
at once recognises the limits of spoken language while permitting forms of symbolic 
communication ‘when communication by word alone is too difficult’ (Watson et al., 2005, 
p. 696).9  
 
Within the confines of the space permitted here, such a review is not intended (nor could it 
ever be) completely exhaustive. Within existing literature, there appear to be some 
significant lacunae. I am unaware, for example, of any empirical and/or clinical studies 
that have explored in full the relationship between complicated grief (where loss is 
experienced as utterly debilitating) and creativity, or that attempt to correlate differences in 
grieving and creativity in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality etc. Future directions 
ripe for empirical study would include the effects of the purported increase in creativity in 
public and private mourning ritual, including the synergy between this and the increased 
creativity facilitated by digital and social media, especially developments such as Web 2.0 
which invite greater user involvement. Nevertheless, whether documented in extant 
theoretical literature or more contemporary studies, there appears to be (perhaps it is, as 
psychologists would suggest, a product of evolutionary processes) an inextinguishable 
human impulse to create in the face of loss; more counter-intuitively, to create something 
beautiful from the ugly detritus of pain and suffering (Edwards, 1993). For creativity 
serves here as a bridge (and to some extent a choice), between a life dominated by the pain 
and suffering of loss, and the future possibilities by which these feelings can be used to 
provide the raw material that can be fashioned into something new, into something that 
can help sustain rather than destroy life.10 
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Notes 
1 Derived from psychology, notions of the assumptive world refer to taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
self and the external world that help serve as an orienting device; a practice guide to thought and action 
governing our understanding of the world, our place within it, and how and why things are the way they are. 
The assumptive world is essentially a benign view of the world—as benevolent, meaningful, and in which 
the self is valued and worthy (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). However, death (especially violent and traumatic 
death), threaten to violate and overwhelm this worldview, replacing it with fear, terror and disillusionment. 
In sociological terms, such a worldview can perhaps be seen to approximate to what Giddens (1991) has 
articulated as ‘ontological security’; the practical consciousness and fundamental feelings of trust, which, in 
phenomenological terms, are related to the tacit assumptions and routines of everyday life. Like one’s 
assumptive world, death and serious illness are a potent threat to the individual’s basic sense of ontological 
security. For a useful discussion of the development of notions of the assumptive world, see Beder (2004-5, 
p. 258-9). See also Mallon (2008).   
2 The synergy created between public and private mourning has led seemingly to an altered funerary and 
commemorative landscape in which creativity, ingenuity and individual self-identity are very much at the 
fore and have replaced standardised cultural protocol in mourning practices. There is abundant anecdotal and 
empirical evidence of creativity in public (e.g. Brennan, 2008; Harlow, 2005; Kear & Steinberg, 1999) and 
private mourning (e.g. Co-operative Funeralcare, 2011).             
3 Becker’s theory provides the theoretical basis for terror management theory (TMT), whereby heightened 
awareness of one’s own mortality is understood to produce not only positive attempts at overcoming death 
(in the immortality fantasies provided by creative cultural activities such as writing a book or producing a 
work of art), but also negative attempts to eliminate others perceived as presenting a threat to our existence. 
For an overview of TMT, see Brennan (2014).   
4 Creative transformation through wounding and loss has also been the subject of Jungian psychoanalysis. 
For a useful discussion of loss as the impetus for creativity and growth from a Jungian perspective, see 
Marlan (2005). For a discussion of creativity as a defence against pain and mourning, see Kogan (2007). For 
a discussion of poetry from a psychoanalytic perspective, as the ego’s attempt to exert mastery over mental 
pain, see Akhtar (2001). For a discussion of the relationship between object loss and creativity more 
generally, see Pollock, 1975, 1977; Hamilton, 1969, 1976, 1979). 
5 For Hershkowitz (2013, p. 54), the origins of art lie in the ‘symbiotic unity and the experience of 
separateness that follows the earliest phase of infancy.’ Born of a desire for maternal oneness and to return 
inside the mother’s body, the urge for creativity has its origins in the oedipal conflict, for it seeks ‘to deny 
the primal scene and erase the real presence of the father’ (ibid.).   
6 Identity, in psychoanalytic terms, is not, as Elliott (2002, p. 21) puts it, somehow ‘magically assigned to us 
by the external world.’ Instead, he explains, it ‘has to be made or created’ and this process is accomplished 
through the ‘twin boundary posts’ of identification and incorporation. Loss is significant to identity in 
psychoanalytic terms because it is the loss of the beloved that precipitates the introjection of that person into 
the structure of the ego itself. It is, as Elliott explains, ‘as if the hurt of losing somebody is so terrifying that 
the ego incorporates the lost love as an act of self-preservation’ (ibid.).   
7 Feminist criticism of psychoanalytic understandings of motherhood has focused upon notions of the ‘good 
enough mother’ first elaborated by paediatrician and object relations theorist D. W. Winnicott (1967). 
Shifting the locus of development from the oedipal rupture between father and child first theorised by Freud 
to the dyadic relationship between mother and child, Winnicott contends that healthy childhood adjustment 
depends upon the quality of the object relations between mother and child. Winnicott’s theory of ‘good 
enough mothering’ has been criticised by some as politically regressive; romantically idealizing motherhood 
in ways that are ‘used against women as both fantasy and blame’ (Elliott, 2002, p. 75). Although Klein’s 
orientation was not explicitly feminist, others have drawn out the feminist significance of her work in 
understanding the experience of female sexuality and mothering (e.g. Chernin, 1986; Dinnerstein, 1978; 
Mitchell, 1986). Dinnerstein (1978) has extended Klein’s analysis in a feminist psychoanalytic direction by 
locating the denigration and subordination of women in society in the absence of shared parenting. In this 
view, precisely because parenting falls primarily upon mothers, the paranoid/depressive anxieties identified 
by Klein as a natural part of infantile development are short-circuited and never fully worked-through. Thus, 
as Sayers (1987, p. 30) explains: ‘If men participated equally with women in childcare…they would then 
equally be invested with phantasies involved in the paranoid and depressive anxieties of infancy.’ For a 
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discussion of feminist psychoanalytic theories of mothering and critique of fantasized/idealized notions of 
the ‘perfect mother’, see Chodorow and Contratto (1989).  
8 The term ‘social death’ refers to the process of social withdrawal by which the long-term sick and dying 
were, for much of the 20th century, treated as already dead, long before physical death occurred: removed 
from the public gaze (usually in hospitals); excluded from communication (with friends, family members, 
and healthcare professionals, c.f., Glaser & Strauss, 1965); and treated with general awkwardness and 
embarrassment by those with whom they did come into contact. In the 21st century, modern communication 
technology and social media, such as blogging by the terminally ill, has seemingly contributed to a process 
of de-sequestration, by which the communicative and spatial segregation of healthy from sick is being 
eroded.  
9 As a creative and therapeutic modality, writing can help ameliorate the effects of grief by allowing grievers 
a sense of interpretive as well as symbolic control in circumstances in which they seemingly have none 
(Doka & Martin, 2011). Writing can also serve as a ‘bridge to a new way of life’, whereby creativity can 
help ‘fill the space left by the one who has died’ (Moss, 2012, p. 13). Specific types of writing, such as 
auto/biography (Stanley, 1993), while not considered creative in the conventional sense, can serve a 
reparative rather than escapist function, helping to re-create a storied sense of what has been lost, to re-create 
a life story, a life disrupted by illness or loss, a life cut short, or a life ending (Letherby, 2009; Thornton & 
Letherby & 2009). To do so in such circumstances can, as Bolton (2008, p. 15) suggests, facilitate healing 
and a sense of hope by helping the person facing impending death or following bereavement to come to 
terms with their loss by creating a narrative that helps them readjust to a changed reality rather than dwell in 
the destructive feelings of loss. 
10 Native American poet Joy Harjo puts it thus: ‘I’ve…come…to realise that this stuff called failure, [...] this 
debris of historical trauma, […] family trauma…stuff that can kill your spirit, is actually material to make 
things with and to build a bridge over that which would [otherwise] destroy you’ (cited in Miller, 2013, p. 
107).  
 
